The Dynamic Phenomenology of Occurrent Thinking by Anderson, Fergus
Phenomenology and Mind, n. 10 - 2016, pp. 196-205
DOI: 10.13128/Phe_Mi-20101
Web: www.fupress.net/index.php/pam
© The Author(s) 2016
CC BY 4.0 Firenze University Press
ISSN 2280-7853 (print) - ISSN 2239-4028 (on line)
THE DYNAMIC PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
OCCURRENT THINKING
abstract
In this paper I argue that there is something missing from the account of occurrent thinking as typically 
presented in the cognitive phenomenology debate. The missing element is what I call the “dynamic” 
phenomenology of thought. Cognitive states are not just static states, they are also dynamic states that 
unfold in time. My main thesis is that this is an important aspect of the phenomenology of thought that 
has a significant bearing on the question of what it is like to think. The evidence I offer in support of 
this claim is drawn from descriptions of two instances of occurrent thinking. Using the descriptions as a 
reference point, I propose that thinking experiences possess a three stage dynamic structure that begins 
with a “productive” stage, progresses to a “receptive” stage and ends in a “reflective” stage. I offer a 
tentative analysis of this structure and I briefly consider some of the implications and objections.
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THE DYNAMIC PHENOMENOLOGY OF OCCURRENT THINKING
This paper is prompted by the observation that there is something missing from 
the experience of occurrent thinking as this is typically presented in the cognitive 
phenomenology debate. The missing element I am referring to has to do with the way that 
thinking experiences occur. While thinking experiences can be analysed and understood 
in terms of what they consist of1, they can also be analysed in terms of how they unfold 
dynamically in time. I will call this the “dynamic” phenomenology of thought, and my aim in 
this paper is to consider thinking from this perspective.
My approach is as follows: I start with a consideration of what cognitive phenomenology in its 
“inclusivist” form means in terms of actual experience, and I propose an answer to this. I then 
describe two cases of conscious occurrent thought from the “dynamic” perspective. My aim in 
describing these cases is that readers will be able to understand in concrete terms what I mean 
by the dynamic phenomenology of thought, and will also be able to evaluate the observations I 
make with reference to their own experience. Having presented the two cases and my thesis, I 
then consider in a provisional way some of the implications within the context of the cognitive 
phenomenology debate, and I also briefly consider some objections. 
Cognitive phenomenology can be understood as the claim that there is something it is 
like to think just as there is something it is like to see, hear or touch. In its more “liberal”, 
“strong” or “inclusivist” forms, it can also be understood as the claim that what it is like to 
think is a constitutive element of what thought essentially is2. But what does the cognitive 
phenomenology thesis mean in terms of actual concrete experience? This might seem like 
an odd question but the answer is not necessarily obvious. Might it mean, for example, that 
there is some kind of additional cognitive phenomenal “something” going on when we 
think? Something that might perhaps normally escape our attention but that we can become 
conscious of if we attend in the right way?
When one considers the cognitive phenomenology thesis then it is clear that this is generally 
not what is meant. Cognitive phenomenology is not something that one needs to notice in 
addition to what one already notices about thought. Rather, it is a kind of re-interpretation of 
1  This might be, for example, an analysis in terms of intentional content and intentional attitude.
2  For overviews of the cognitive phenomenology debate see Bayne & Montague (2011b); Smithies (2013). Recent 










something that is already fully noticed and taken into account. When I think, I am occurrently 
aware of the meaning of the thought, which means that I am aware of the thought’s content 
(i.e., I am aware of what the thought is about). This capacity to be aware of thought content is 
uncontroversial, but it would traditionally be accounted for in non-phenomenal terms. What 
the cognitive phenomenology thesis proposes is that this awareness of thought content is itself 
phenomenal. In other words, to the extent that one is occurrently aware of the meaning of a 
thought, one is also consciously experiencing cognitive phenomenology.
Pitt appears to be making this point when he says that by “immediate” and non-inferential 
conscious introspection “one is able to identify each of one’s occurrent conscious thoughts 
as the thought it is (i.e., as having the content it does)” (Pitt 2004, p. 7). I also take him to be 
articulating the same point when he says “the cognitive phenomenal character of an occurrent 
conscious thought is its intentional content” (Pitt 2011, p. 141, original emphasis). Charles 
Siewert also seems to be saying something similar when he says:
[...] the inclusivist does not require that, in addition to the on-going differences in ways 
of thinking and understanding that you already discriminate in first-person reflection, 
there is phenomenally something more we should look for. Rather what we are asked 
to consider is that some such reflectively recognised variations in one’s manner of 
thought and understanding are themselves phenomenal differences, whether or not you 
think of them as such (Siewert 2011, p. 249, original emphasis).
To summarise, we could say that occurrent awareness of thought content is itself the 
cognitive phenomenal character of thought, and cognitive phenomenology is that, it is not 
something in addition to that. There are clearly other ways that cognitive phenomenology 
could be interpreted, but this is how I will understand it for the purposes of this paper. It 
is a kind of “immediate” experience where phenomenal character and intentional content 
are one and the same. Note that this is different to sensory phenomenal experience, in 
that with sensory experience, phenomenal character and intentional content are clearly 
distinct (e.g., the phenomenal character of redness is not the same as the red tomato). 
Chudnoff refers to the kind of awareness where phenomenal character and intentional 
content are combined as self-presentational (Chudnoff 2015, p. 40), and I will adopt the same 
term here. Self-presentational awareness, then, is what characterises the experience of 
occurrent conscious thought3.
With this brief preamble in place, I am now ready to turn to the main topic of this paper, 
which, as already stated, is the dynamic phenomenology of thought. I have said what I take 
cognitive phenomenology to mean in terms of actual experience, however, this still says 
nothing about how cognitive phenomenal experiences occur. It is interesting that although 
cognitive phenomenology is exclusively a thesis about occurrent thought, there is almost 
nothing said in the literature about how it occurs. In the next section I will address this aspect 
of cognitive phenomenology by considering two cases of occurrent thinking. My aim is to 
describe the cases as accurately as possible as I experience them, and then to use this to throw 
light on the question of how cognitive phenomenology occurs. 
3  Please note that by “self-presentational” I do not necessarily mean “self-representational” (e.g., Kriegel & Williford, 
2006). Self-representational means that a state represents itself in some way, but with self-presentational I mean that 
a state is fully and immediately presented as what it is. 
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The first case I will consider is that of thinking the meaning of a single abstract word, and 
the second case is that of relating two abstract concepts4. The aim in both cases is not a 
description of what the word or concepts mean, but a description of how conscious awareness 
of meaning occurs or arises. As I have said, readers are invited to carry out these exercises 
and compare their own experience against my descriptions. Readers can also experiment with 
other exercises of their own that perhaps achieve the same result more effectively. The aim is 
to find simple thought tasks that begin with an experience of not understanding and then lead 
to an experience of understanding. It is particularly this transition that I am interested in.
In this exercise the task is to think the meaning of single abstract word. The word is 
“although”.
1. I begin by bringing thinking to a stop for a few moments. I then say the word “although” 
to myself silently, while maintaining a state of not thinking. As I hear (or feel?) the word 
being spoken, I do not know what it means. I say it to myself a few times but all I am aware 
of is the more or less meaningless saying of the word.
2. I also have a sense that if I am to understand the word, then I have to become active, i.e., 
I have to activate myself in a way that is over and above the mere saying. I do not know 
what it is I have to do in order to do this, but it seems to involve bringing “myself” into 
movement at some level.
3. When I try to carry out this movement, it is initially experienced as a kind of resistance. 
It is as if I have to push through to an experience of the meaning, i.e., as if there is a kind 
of barrier or veil between myself and the meaning. To overcome this resistance I feel as if 
have to move or refocus myself, perhaps as if I am moving or refocusing my attention.
4. As I do this, I discover that the movement is experienced as a kind of “imagining” of 
what the word means, i.e., it is a kind of “inventing” or “making-up” activity. This is also 
experienced as momentarily immersive, as if I have to let go of what I am trying to do in 
order to do it. For a moment it is as if I disappear into the doing of it.
5. Within (and perhaps as a result of) this “imagining” activity, I am for a moment directly 
aware of some aspect of the meaning of the word. It is as if something that was obscuring 
my view is momentarily lifted and I now directly “see” or “behold” something of what 
the word means. However, it is just a fleeting glimpse. There is also no image or picture 
associated with this. I.e., there is nothing in addition to what I behold other than the 
meaning I momentarily behold.
6. This moment of “beholding” is qualitatively different to the “imaginative” activity that 
preceded it, in that it is experienced as a kind of “receptivity” or “receiving” whereas the 
previous experience was one of active “producing” or “doing”.
7. This moment of direct awareness of meaning shifts quickly into a kind of reflective judgement 
that forms almost simultaneously into words. I say to myself: “although prepares the way for an 
approaching statement by acknowledging the existence of a previous statement that is in some sense 
contradictory”. On reflection I find this formulation in some way lacking, and I try again to 
access a direct experience of what the word means so that I can adjust my formulation.
4  The reason for choosing relatively abstract thinking is that in my view it better exposes the particular 
phenomenology I am interested in. However, the same phenomenology is observable in a much wider range of 
thinking experiences. 
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In this exercise the task is to think the relation between two abstract concepts. The two 
concepts are “continuity” and “permanence”.
1. I begin by bringing thinking to a standstill for a few moments. I then say both words 
silently to myself while maintaining a state of relative inner stillness (i.e., I try not to 
“think”). As I say the words to myself, I am not aware of what the concepts mean or how 
they are related.
2. I then begin to try to think the meaning of one of the concepts. I say “continuity” and try 
to think what this means. This is first experienced as a kind of resistance or barrier, but 
as I begin to think, I carry out what I can best describe as a kind of creative activity. I.e., It 
is as if I am “inventing” or “making up” what the word means. This is also experienced as 
becoming inwardly active or mobile at some level.
3. Out of this I experience moments of direct awareness of the meaning of “continuity”, or 
some aspect of it. What I experience when I experience these moments is a direct and 
immediate “knowing”, but there is no image or picture associated with this. The meaning 
I momentarily behold is fully presented as what it is in the moment of beholding it. 
This experience also has a certain “receptive” or “sensitive” quality in contrast to the 
“productive” activity that preceded it.
4. With this awareness of meaning still present, I think the second concept in the same way as 
the first, and try to relate the two. In doing this I realise that thinking the relation between 
the concepts is quite different from thinking the individual concepts. For when thinking 
the individual concepts, I start from the saying of the word (“continuity”, “permanence”) 
but in thinking the relation between them there is no word from which to start. The task is 
therefore perhaps harder. 
5. In “imagining” the connection between the two concepts, it is as if I am already in some 
sense guided by the relation that I am not yet aware of. In other words, in my activity of 
“imagining” I am already sensitive or receptive to the meaning that will come, and it is this 
that in some sense already guides my “imagining”.
6. Out of this creative activity emerge moments of directly or immediately experiencing some 
aspect of the relation between the two concepts. This is experienced as if a barrier or veil 
is momentarily lifted, revealing a “scene”. But there is no image-like content connected 
with this, i.e., nothing that I “see”, only an immediate awareness of meaning that quickly 
disappears again.
7. Each moment of awareness of meaning forms almost immediately and more or less 
spontaneously into a verbal formulation. I experience this also as a loss of the immediate 
“beholding” of meaning. I now have a specific and defined verbal content that more or less 
represents the meaning. 
8. There is also a kind of residue of the direct awareness of meaning that seems to remain for 
a short while (perhaps one or two seconds) after the direct awareness itself has ended. This 
residual awareness helps in arriving at an accurate verbal formulation in that I can check 
my formulation against it, at least for as long as it lasts.
9. The following formulations arise in this way. Each one is formulated out of a different 
moment of “beholding” and the sequence is given in the same order in which it arose. 
(Note to reader: As you read these formulations, try to observe what you inwardly do in 
order to grasp and understand them. The point is not whether or not the formulations are 
right, the point is what you do in order to “think” them.) 
a. Whereas permanence emphasises the unchanging, continuity emphasises something 
maintained and carried over within a context of change.
b. Permanence does not necessarily have continuity because continuity implies change, 
and permanence has little (or no?) room for change. 
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c. Permanence can be an aspect of continuity, though it does not have to be. Something 
could still have continuity with nothing in it being permanent.
d. If something had the attribute of permanence, this attribute would not be that which 
gives it continuity. 
e. Continuity is not given by the presence of an element within it that remains 
unchanging. Rather, continuity is given by the presence of a particular kind of change.
The two thinking experiences described above show a similar structure. The descriptions 
begin with the saying of a word but the saying itself is not enough to “understand” what 
the word means. The additional something that is required is a kind of productive or 
imaginative activity, out of which arise moments where some aspect of what the word means 
is immediately and momentarily “beheld”. This is a receptive kind of experience in that it is 
as if something is “sensed” or “felt”. This turns almost immediately into a kind of evaluating 
or judging of what is beheld. There is now a new content of some sort that can be doubted, 
believed, etc. The shift from a direct “beholding” experience to a more reflective “evaluating” 
experience can be characterised by saying that in the first instance there is an immediate 
experience of something actually being a certain way, whereas in the second instance 
something is represented as being (or understood to be) a certain way. 
Summarising this, the three stages (abbreviated to s1, s2, s3) can be schematically represented 
as follows:
Note that the three stages extend in the temporal sense (t1 to t2)5, but the duration is typically 
very brief (perhaps a couple of seconds in total from t1 to t2)6. Also, the three stages do not 
necessarily have to occur in just this order. For example, it seems possible for s1 and s2 to 
alternate rapidly before leading to s3. (e.g.: s1 | s2 | s1 | s2 | s3). It also seems possible that s1 can 
occur without leading to s2 or s3 at all7. However, according to my experience, s2 can only 
occur if it is preceded by s1, and s3 can only occur if it is preceded by s2, though in the latter 
case there is an important qualification that I will return to below. 
Let us assume for the moment that there is such a dynamic phenomenology of occurrent 
thought, and that it is broadly along the lines I have articulated. I will call this the dynamic 
phenomenology of thought thesis, or DPT. Put simply, DPT is the claim that instances of 
occurrent thinking have a certain dynamic structure in time. Thought begins with a productive 
5  I do not necessarily mean by this that each stage has temporal extension. One or other of the stages may not have 
temporal extension and have more the character of an instantaneous event. However, the whole sequence taken 
together (t1 to t2) clearly seems to have temporal extension.
6  Some occurrent thinking experiences can also be much longer and some perhaps also much shorter.
7  An example of this might be trying to think the meaning of a word in an unfamiliar language. The activity of 
“imagining” can still be carried out but it does not progress to an actual awareness of meaning, i.e., it does not 




activity, shifts to a moment of receptivity and ends with a state of reflective representation. In what 
follows I will try to explore this thesis in a very provisional way with reference to some familiar 
theory. My aim is not to try to prove DPT, but simply to open up some of the possible lines of 
inquiry that follow from it, particularly in relation to the cognitive phenomenology debate.
In section 1.1., I made the claim that cognitive phenomenology can be understood as a kind of 
“self-presentational” experience in which phenomenal character and intentional content are 
one and the same. However, from the above description, this only characterises one aspect of 
occurrent thought, namely, the second stage (s2). The second stage is described as a moment 
of immediate awareness or “beholding”, and this fits well with the idea of self-presentational 
awareness. However, s2 arises out of s1, which is quite different. Here there is an immersive 
“imagining” or “creative” activity that is not necessarily self-presentational, seeing as an 
awareness of the content of thought has not yet arisen. This suggests that s1 may not involve 
cognitive phenomenology at all, but may involve some other kind of phenomenology, such as 
agentive phenomenology8. 
S3 is a different state again, and perhaps best understood as a propositional state analysable 
in content/attitude terms. Here the meaning of what has been grasped is accessible but is not 
directly and immediately experienced. So perhaps s3 is best understood as a kind of access 
conscious state (Block 1997) or perhaps as a kind of higher-order state (Rosenthal 1986) rather 
than a kind of cognitive phenomenal state. I will not try to decide these details here. The 
general point I would like to make is that occurrent thinking is not just one kind of state with 
one kind of phenomenology, rather, it is a dynamic movement that involves internal shifts and 
transitions of a structured kind9.
One obvious objection to the DPT thesis is that if there really is a dynamic phenomenology 
of thought as described then why is it not more commonly recognised? One response to this 
is that not all cognitive states are dynamic states in the DPT sense. For example, it seems 
quite possible to enter into an s3 type state but where the corresponding s1 and s2 stages have 
occurred at some time in the past. Or, put another way: it is possible to recall the result (i.e., 
s3) of a past thinking experience that originally included s1, s2 and s3, but without actually 
again re-experiencing s1 and s2 in the occurrent sense. I suggested earlier that the s2 stage 
of “beholding” can only occur if preceded by s1, and also that the s3 stage can only occur if 
preceded by s2. The qualification I mentioned is that once an s3 stage has arisen (as a result of 
s1 and s2), it can be recalled without a new occurrent instance of s1 and s2. The upshot of this is 
that many broadly “cognitive” states that arise in day-to-day experience do not involve s1 and 
s2 in the occurrent sense. This makes the possibility of overlooking the role of s1 and s2 that 
much easier. What is needed, I would suggest, is that occurrent intentional states of the s3 kind 
need to be clearly distinguished from thinking experiences of the full “dynamic” kind (i.e., 
involving s1, s2 and s3). If this distinction is not made, then it is much easier to take the end 
result of an occurrent thinking experience (i.e. s3) as the complete experience. It is also much 
easier to overlook the existence of s1 and s2 by attending to s3 type states that genuinely lack 
s1 and s2 in the occurrent sense.
However, this still does not explain why occurrent instances of thinking where all three 
stages are involved (s1, s2 ,s3) are not commonly recognised as such. Here I would point to the 
fact that s1 and s2 are active in a way that s3 is not. Because s1 involves an “imaginative” and 
8  The notion of agentive phenomenology is controversial, and I won’t go into a discussion of it here. For overviews 
see Bayne (2008) and Soteriou (2009a). For a discussion specifically in the context of mental agency see Soteriou 
(2009b).
9  It is possible that by differentiating the dynamic structure of thought some of the competing theories about the 
nature of occurrent thought could be found to be complementary parts of the same dynamic picture. 
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“creative” activity of the subject, and because s2 is closely connected to this, it means that both 
stages are experienced in a much more pre-reflective way than s3. In other words, s1 and s2 
are conscious states but not reflectively conscious states10, and therefore they are overlooked. 
Only with s3 does a fully reflective awareness of content emerge and therefore this state is 
what is primarily noticed. One could therefore say that much of what is commonly taken to 
be occurrent thought in the literature (for example propositional attitudes involving that-
clauses) is actually only one aspect of occurrent thought, namely, the final “representational” 
stage s3.
There is a further factor connected with this. One of the reasons why sensory states and 
cognitive states have traditionally been seen as radically separate11 is that there is an obvious 
qualitative difference between them. Whereas sensory states clearly have phenomenal 
character, cognitive states do not, or at least not in the same obvious way. The question that 
this raises for the cognitive phenomenology thesis is why there is such a qualitative difference, 
given that both kinds of states are phenomenal12? The DPT thesis can answer this as follows: 
Cognitive phenomenology has the phenomenal character it does (i.e., of seeming to entirely 
lack phenomenal character) because the subject is intimately involved in producing the content 
of the state. In other words, what is “created” in s1 is intimately linked to what is “beheld” in 
s2. One might say that thinking must first create something in order for a cognitive state to 
arise at all. The reason why sensory phenomenology is so concretely present and substantial 
for our awareness is that we play a less intimate role in bringing about our awareness of it. For 
this reason also, thought is almost entirely insubstantial and as having almost no phenomenal 
character at all, while at the same time being intimately and immediately meaningful. This 
qualitative difference between cognitive phenomenology and sensory phenomenology 
perhaps becomes more understandable when the dynamic stages of thought (s1, s2, s3) are 
taken into account.
Another objection that could be brought against DPT is that it mistakenly takes thought to 
involve a creative act. For example, Galen Strawson (2003) claims that:
No actual natural thinking of a thought, no actual having of a particular thought-
content, is ever itself an action. Mental action in thinking is restricted to the fostering 
of conditions hospitable to contents’ coming to mind. The coming to mind itself – the 
actual occurrence of thoughts, conscious or non-conscious – is not a matter of action 
(Strawson 2003, p. 234).
I will not go into the details of Strawson’s argument here, or some of the counter arguments13. 
I will only briefly make the point that Strawson’s position is not necessarily at odds with the 
one I have presented. Strawson argues that thoughts “just happen”, i.e., there is no agency 
involved in the conscious occurring of thought content. However, he acknowledges that there 
may well be agency involved in the “prefatory” or “catalytic” actions that foster this occurring 
(Strawson 2003, p. 231). But why should these “prefatory” or “catalytic” actions be considered 
10  See Gallagher & Zahavi for a discussion of pre-reflectivity.
11  See Horgan & Tiensen (2002) for an overview of the traditional tendency to “separatism” in philosophy of mind.
12  The answer that is often given to this is that cognitive phenomenal states are as different to sensory phenomenal 
states as the different sensory modalities are different to each other. In other words, there’s nothing special about 
cognitive phenomenology in this regard. However, this still does not explain why cognitive phenomenology has 
the unique characteristic of appearing to lack phenomenal character. In this it is different to all kinds of sensory 
phenomenology. 
13  For example: Peakocke (2007); Proust (2001).
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as not also integral to thought? It seems strange that there are actions that are necessary in 
order for thoughts to occur, but that these actions have absolutely nothing to do with thought 
itself. Put in terms of the DPT thesis, s1 can be considered as just such a prefatory or catalytic 
agentive aspect of thought, whereas s2 can be seen as a non-agentive or “receptive” aspect. 
There is therefore not necessarily a contradiction with Strawon’s argument on this point, as 
long as one extends the notion of what can properly belong to thought.
A further objection to the DPT thesis might be the following: S1 has been described as a 
creative act that produces something that is then immediately “beheld” in s2. This raises 
the problem of how thought can be about something beyond itself. If thought “produces” 
what it “beholds”, then it is entirely solipsistic, i.e., it never gets outside its own closed 
circle. However, to make this objection misinterprets the relationship between s1 and s2, as 
I understand it. What is produced in s1 through a creative act is not then what becomes the 
content of “beholding” in s2. Rather, what is produced in s1 is what makes the beholding 
possible. To put this another way, one could say that what is produced in s1 is comparable in 
its function to a sense organ. I.e., there is a productive or creative act that produces something 
to see with. Though here of course what is “beheld” is not some sensory phenomenal 
something but the content of the thought, and this “content” needs to be understood in the 
self-presentational sense. The point is that even though the “creative” act in s1 does enable the 
beholding of s2, the relationship is not one where the former creates the content for the latter.
In this paper I have presented a tentative thesis regarding the dynamic phenomenology of 
occurrent thought, and I have done this primarily by using two examples of occurent thinking. 
I have also offered some provisional analysis of how the dynamic phenomenology of thought 
might be understood. Admittedly there is much that would need to be addressed in order to give 
the DPT thesis more substance, and what I have presented is only a very first step towards this.
No doubt some will see my reliance on first-person “introspective” evidence as a serious 
weakness, and I have not tried to address these concerns. There are legitimate worries about 
the validity of introspection within the cognitive phenomenology debate14, however, I think 
it also has its place, particularly when combined with other methods15. Obviously more than 
introspective observations would be needed in order to substantiate the DPT thesis, but this 
does not mean that introspective reports are not a valid starting point. I take what I have 
presented here as just such a starting point16.
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